Sanctions announced

The U.S. Treasury Department unveiled a new round of sanctions aimed at crippling a maritime drug‑running network centred on Ecuador’s Pacific coast. Ten fishing vessels based in the tuna hub of Manta were placed on the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) “blocked property” list, while fifteen individuals and entities linked to the operation were designated for sanctions.

Both The Maritime Executive and Marine Insight note that the Treasury’s action targets vessels that “appear to conduct legitimate activity, but are in fact actively involved in cocaine trafficking.” The embargo means any U.S. person is prohibited from dealing with the listed boats or their owners, and any assets under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.

Scale of the illicit shipments

The Treasury’s statement, as reported by gCaptain, alleges that the fleet moves “tons of cocaine to Mexico each month, ultimately bound for the United States.” Marine Insight adds that the network is responsible for moving “thousands of kilograms of cocaine each month” from South America through Mexico. One operator identified in the sanction list – Julio Javier Mero Franco – is accused of coordinating the movement of “about 30 to 40 tons of cocaine each month” from Ecuador to Central America and Mexico.

While the exact tonnage varies between sources, all three outlets agree that the volume is substantial enough to merit a coordinated U.S. response.

Operational tactics employed by the fishing fleet

The Treasury describes a two‑stage logistics chain. First, “large fishing vessels… secretly transfer cocaine to small power boats, known as go‑fast vessels,” before the cargo is handed over for transit northward across the Eastern Pacific (gCaptain). The same description appears in Marine Insight, which notes that the go‑fast boats then travel “north through the Eastern Pacific Ocean.”

Beyond mere transfer, the sanctioned fishing boats are alleged to provide a suite of support services: fuel, food and medical assistance; detection and monitoring of law‑enforcement vessels; and the use of government‑subsidised fuel to sustain the operation (Marine Insight). These activities effectively turn ordinary tuna‑fishing enterprises into logistical hubs for narcotics smuggling.

Ties to violent cartels

The interdiction effort targets groups that the United States has designated as Foreign Terrorist Organisations. Both Los Choneros and its splinter group Los Lobos – two of Ecuador’s most violent drug gangs – are named in every source as the primary Ecuadorian actors (The Maritime Executive; gCaptain; Marine Insight). The Treasury further links the network to Mexican cartels, specifically the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), which are also listed as FTOs.

According to Marine Insight, after the cocaine is handed off to go‑fast boats, it “is then smuggled through Mexico by groups including the Sinaloa Cartel and Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion.” The cross‑border collaboration underscores a transnational supply chain that stretches from Colombian and Peruvian production fields, via Ecuadorian maritime cover, to Mexican distribution networks before reaching U.S. markets.

Individuals and businesses singled out

The sanctions list includes several family‑run enterprises operating near Manta. Marine Insight identifies Alfonso Mero Mero and his sons – Roberth Alfonso Mero Arcentales and Edwar Alexis Mero Arcentales – as operators of the fishing company Arcasdenoe, S.A., alleged to have moved “thousands of kilograms of cocaine” and supplied fuel to go‑fast vessels. The same outlet states that Edwar Mero Arcentales was involved in trafficking with Los Choneros.

These personal details appear solely in Marine Insight; no other source corroborates the names, so they are treated as unconfirmed within this report.

What this means for operators

For ship owners and crew operating in the Eastern Pacific, the sanctions raise immediate compliance obligations. Any vessel that matches the description of a “large fishing boat operating out of Manta” must undergo rigorous due‑diligence checks to ensure it is not on OFAC’s blocked list. Operators should verify ownership structures, fuel procurement records and cargo manifests against the names released by Treasury.

Failure to heed the restrictions can result in asset freezes, denial of port services in U.S. jurisdictions and potential secondary sanctions for non‑U.S. entities that facilitate prohibited transactions. Companies with regional supply chains are advised to audit subcontractors, especially those providing fuel or logistical support to fishing fleets, as the Treasury has highlighted the use of “government‑subsidised fuel” in the illicit scheme.

In practice, maritime operators should:

  • Screen vessel IMO numbers and owners against OFAC’s latest list before entering contracts.
  • Implement monitoring systems for cargo transfers that could conceal narcotics, particularly when interfacing with small powerboats.
  • Educate crew on the legal repercussions of unwitting involvement in drug‑smuggling activities.
  • Coordinate with local port authorities in Ecuador and neighboring states to confirm compliance status of vessels requesting services.

By tightening operational oversight, the industry can help deter further exploitation of legitimate fisheries as a conduit for narcotics, aligning commercial practice with the heightened regulatory scrutiny emanating from Washington.